Introduction: Race and/as Technology; or, How to Do Things to Race by Chun, Wendy Hui Kyong

Introduction: Race and/as Technology; or, How to 
Do Things to Race  
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun 
Final version published in:
Camera Obscura 70, Volume 24, Number 1 doi 
10.1215/02705346-2008-013 © 2009 by Camera Obscura 
a publication of Duke University Press  
This special issue poses the questions: to what degree 
are race and technology intertwined? Can race be 
considered a technology or a form of media—that is, 
not only a mechanism, but also a practical or industrial 
art? Could race be not simply an object of repre-
sentation and portrayal, of knowledge or truth, but also 
a technique that one uses, even as one is used by it—a 
carefully crafted, historically inflected system of tools, 
mediation, or enframing that builds history and 
identity?  
“Race and/as technology” is a strange, and 
hopefully estranging, formulation, but its peculiarity 
does not stem from its conjoining of race and 
technology. There already exists an important body of 
scholarship that simply addresses race and technology 
in science and technology, media and visual culture, 
and African American and ethnic studies, ranging, just 
to give some examples, from analyses documenting the 
resurgence of race as a valid scientific category to those 
tracing the historically intersecting truth claims of 
phrenology and photography, from investigations 
uncovering the centrality of data processing to the 
execution of the Holocaust to those analyzing the 
importance of raced images to mass-mediated consumer 
culture.
1 
These works have mapped the ways in which 
race and technology impact each other’s logic and 
development, especially in relation to enterprises that 
seek to establish the truth of race as a scientific fact or 
as a cultural phenomenon.  
Yet the consideration of race as technology 
brings even more questions forward. Crucially, race as 
technology shifts the focus from the what of race to the 
how of race, from knowing race to doing race by 
emphasizing the similarities between race and tech-
nology. Indeed, race as technology is a simile that 
posits a comparative equality or substitutability—but 
not identity—between the two terms. Race as 
technology, however, is not simply an example of a 
simile; it also exemplifies similes by encapsulating the 
larger logic of comparison that makes both race and 
similes possible. Race as technology reveals how race 
functions as the “as,” how it facilitates comparisons 
between entities classed as similar or dissimilar. This 
comparison of race and technology also displaces 
claims of race as either purely biological or purely 
cultural because technological mediation, which has 
been used to define humankind as such (“man” as a 
“tool-using” animal), is always already a mix of 
science, art, and culture. Humans and technology, as 
Bernard Stiegler has argued, evolve together.
2
 Race, it 
therefore follows, has never been simply biological or 
cultural; rather, it has been crucial to negotiating and 
establishing historically variable definitions of biology 
and culture. Thus, as the articles included in this special 
issue make clear, by framing questions of race and 
technology, as well as by reframing race as technology, 
in relation to modes of media naturalization, not only 
can we theoretically and historically better understand 
the force of race and technology and their relation to 
racism; we can also better respond to contemporary 
changes in the relationships between human and 
machine, human and animal, mediation and 
embodiment, nature and culture, visibility and 
invisibility, privacy and publicity.  
Race, in the biological and medical sciences, 
has returned as a new form of natural history, that is, as 
a means to track “the great human diaspora” through 
mainly invisible (nonexpressed) genetic differences or 
as a way to weigh risk factors for certain diseases.
3
 As 
Jennifer Reardon has noted, these biological “confirma-
tions” have disturbed the post–World War II, cross-
disciplinary “consensus” on the physical nonexistence 
of race, catching off guard many humanities scholars, 
whose critiques rested in part on “scientific evidence.”
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In response, some, such as the philosopher of science 
Lisa Gannett, have analyzed the ways in which race 
never left population science; similarly, some historians 
of science and medicine, such as Evelyn Hammonds, 
have highlighted the biases underpinning the use of 
current and historical race.
5 
Others, such as Henry 
Louis Gates Jr., have embraced DNA tracing to write a 
more comprehensive African American history, and 
still others, such as Paul Gilroy, have argued that these 
new biological categorizations, because they view the 
body from a nanological perspective from which race 
may exist but is not visible, defy the epidermal logic 
that has traditionally defined race and thus offer us an 
opportunity to shelve race altogether.
6 
That is, if race—
like media—has involved linking what is visible to 
what is invisible—then Gilroy argues that race, as an 
invisible entity, can no longer buttress its logic of 
revelation. This debate over the ontology of race is 
important, and this special issue seeks to supplement it 
with an analysis of race’s utility, regardless of its 
alleged essence, suggesting how race itself has proven 
key to the modern concept of essence that is apparent in 
discourses of science and art, of education and 
entertainment, alike. Most important, understanding 
race and/as technology enables us to frame the 
discussion around ethics rather than around ontology, 
on modes of recognition and relation, rather than on 
being.  
Clustered around questions of the face, the 
articles in this special issue focus on how, through 
various media, we relate to, visualize, and recognize 
each other. They also reveal how race is used to 
construct connections between—and indeed construct 
the very concepts of—public and private, outside and 
inside. In addition to questioning the logic of revelation 
that drives both mainstream mass media and the 
epistemological value of race, they also explore the 
extent to which race and media can be used to make 
possible different configurations of visibility, of self 
and other. In what follows, I offer a historical and 
theoretical context for these interventions by outlining 
the ways in which race has been framed as both biology 
and culture, and how this dichotomy also relies on and 
is disturbed by race as technology. I further outline the 
stakes of this reconfiguration of race by considering the 
ways in which race can be considered a “saving” grace.  
 
Making the Visible Innate  
At a certain level, the notion of race as technology 
seems obvious, for race historically has been a tool of 
subjugation. From Carl Linnaeus’s eighteenth-century 
taxonomy of human races in Systema naturae to 
Charles Davenport’s early twentieth-century “documen-
tation” of the disastrous effects of miscegenation, from 
the horrors of the Holocaust to continuing debates over 
the innateness of intelligence, supposedly objective 
scientific categorizations of race have been employed to 
establish hierarchical differences between people, 
rendering some mere objects to be exploited, enslaved, 
measured, demeaned, and sometimes destroyed.
7
 In the 
US, racist theories maintained the contradiction at the 
heart of the nation’s founding: that of all men being 
created equal and black slaves counting as three-fifths 
human (thus allowing them to be accounted for, but not 
themselves count). Even after emancipation, racist 
legislation and bureaucratic practices such as seg-
regation, with its validation of discrimination in social 
and private spaces as “natural antipathies,” maintained 
inequalities in a facially equal democratic system. Race 
in these circumstances was wielded —and is still 
wielded —as an invaluable mapping tool, a means by 
which origins and boundaries are simultaneously traced 
and constructed and through which the visible traces of 
the body are tied to allegedly innate invisible 
characteristics.  
Race as a mapping tool stems from its 
emergence as a scientific category in the eighteenth 
century, although it has consistently designated 
relations based on perceived commonalities. According 
to Bruce Dain, race first denoted a group of people 
connected by common descent (e.g., a noble house, 
family, kindred); then, in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, the era of exploration, it roughly 
corresponded to “geographical groups of people marked 
by supposedly common physical characteristics” (e.g., 
the English race); lastly, in the eighteenth century, it 
designated all humankind (in distinction to animals), as 
well as the subspecies of Homo sapiens, such as Homo 
sapiens asiaticus; according to Linnaeus, a male of this 
subset is “yellowish, melancholy, endowed with black 
hair and brown eyes . . . severe, conceited, and stingy. 
He puts on loose clothing. He is governed by opinion.”
8 
As science moved from eighteenth-century natural 
history, which based its species classifications on 
visible structures, to nineteenth-century science, which 
pursued the invisible processes of life itself, race 
became an even more important means by which the 
visible and the invisible were linked.
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The modern value of race stemmed from its ability 
to link somatic differences to innate physical and 
mental characteristics. According to Samira Kawash,  
 
In this shift to a modern, biologized 
understanding of race, skin color becomes visible 
as a basis for determining the order of identities 
and differences and subsequently penetrates the 
body to become the truth of the self. . . . Race is 
on the skin, but skin is the sign of something 
deeper, something hidden in the invisible interior 
of the organism (as organic or ontological). To 
see racial difference is therefore to see the bodily 
sign of race but also to see more than this seeing, 
to see the interior difference it stands for.
10 
 
This “seeing” of internal difference makes accidental 
characteristics essential, prescriptors rather than 
descriptors. In terms of US slavery, dark skin became 
the mark of the natural condition of slavery through 
which all kinds of external factors —and the violence 
perpetrated on African slaves—became naturalized and 
“innate.” As Saidiya Hartmann has argued, “the wanton 
use of and the violence directed toward the black body 
come to be identified as its pleasures and dangers —
that is, the expectations of slave property are 
ontologized as the innate capabilities and inner feelings 
of the enslaved, and moreover, the ascription of excess 
and enjoyment to the African effaces the violence 
perpetrated against the enslaved.”
11
 For many 
antiracists, then, the key to loosening the power of 
racism was (and still is) to denaturalize race, to loosen 
the connection between the bodily sign of race and 
what it signifies.  
The US has a long history of this attempt at 
denaturing, from the work of radical abolitionists in the 
nineteenth century to that of cultural anthropologists in 
the twentieth. Frederick Douglass, in his 
commencement address at Western Reserve College in 
1854, famously contended that similarities between the 
bodies of Irish workers and black slaves undermined 
theories of racial traits as inherent or natural.
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 To 
Douglass, the congruence between the “deformed” 
physical features of the American slave and the com-
mon Irish man revealed the importance of education 
and class to bodily form, and the accomplishments of 
many Irish thinkers (and implicitly of himself) testified 
to the potential of emancipated and educated slaves. For 
Douglass, racist arguments about the inherent 
inferiority of Africans were also a case of media bias, 
since they would always feature images of the “best” 
Caucasians next to those of the most oppressed African 
slaves. Franz Boas also deployed arguments against 
“natural” reasons for visible racial traits in the 1930s. 
Boas’s work, which was key to transforming race from 
a biological to an anthropological category, argued 
against the innateness of both racial traits and racism.
13
 
Challenging those who advocated racism as a form of 
natural selection, Boas contended that antagonism 
between closed social groups may be innate, but that 
what constituted a social group was not.  
After World War II and the public renunciation 
by many scientists of overtly racist science in various 
UNESCO statements, race as a cultural, rather than a 
biological, fact seemed universally accepted, and the 
“two cultures” of the sciences and the humanities 
cemented together around this common understanding. 
Indeed, many humanists in the late twentieth century 
rested their own critique of race as ideological on 
scientific definitions of race. Henry Louis Gates Jr., for 
instance, argued:  	  
Race has become a trope of ultimate, irreducible 
difference between cultures, linguistics groups, or 
adherents of specific belief systems which—more 
often than not—also have fundamentally opposed 
economic interests. Race is the ultimate trope of 
difference because it is so very arbitrary in its 
difference. The biological criteria used to 
determine “difference” in sex simply do not hold 
when applied to “race.” Yet we carelessly use 
language in such a way as to will this sense of 
natural difference into our formulations.14  
 
By calling race a careless use of language, Gates 
implies that the problem of racism (which stems from 
race) could be fixed by a more careful use of language. 
Racism, in other words, stemmed from faulty media 
representations, and thus the best way to combat it was 
to offer more realist portrayals of “raced others” and to 
produce media critiques that exposed the fallacies of 
racial thinking.  
As mentioned previously, the resurgence of the 
category of race in science and medicine has troubled 
this position, which rests, as Reardon notes, on a 
separation between what are evaluated as “ideological” 
and “true” scientific statements—a separation that work 
across media and cultural studies has repeatedly 
emphasized is impossible.
15
 Even more damning, 
despite the good intentions behind the reformulation, 
the conceptualization of race as culture has created no 
fewer social divisions than the notion of race as 
biology. Racist arguments have adeptly substituted 
culture for nature, creating what Etienne Balibar has 
called “neo-racism.”
16 
For instance, as Anne Anlin 
Cheng has pointed out, the psychological evidence used 
in Brown v. Board of Education—the “doll test,” which 
was pivotal to the juridical overturning of segregation 
in schools—is now used to justify segregation as 
granting “black children the opportunity to develop a 
stronger, ‘healthier,’ more independent black 
identity.”
17 
Rather than the abatement of racism and 
raced images after World War II, we have witnessed 
their proliferation. As Toni Morrison notes:  
Race has become metaphorical—a way of 
referring to and disguising forces, events, 
classes, and expressions of social decay and 
economic division far more threatening to the 
body politic than biological “race” ever was. 
Expensively kept, economically unsound, a 
spurious and useless political asset in election 
campaigns, racism is as healthy today as it was 
during the Enlightenment. It seems that it has a 
utility far beyond economy, beyond the 
sequestering of classes from one another, and 
has assumed a metaphorical life so completely 
embedded in daily discourse that it is perhaps 
more necessary and more on display than ever 
before.18  
Although Morrison here argues that race has become 
metaphorical, it is important to note the ways in which 
race, cultural or biological, acts as a trope. Even when 
understood as biological, race was not simply indexical, 
but rather still served as a sign, as a form of mediation, 
as a vehicle for revelation.  
 
On the Limits of Culture  
Race, either conceived as biology or as culture, 
organizes social relationships and turns the body into a 
signifier. Michael Omi and Howard Winant have 
influentially argued that race is “a fundamental 
organizing principle of social relationships,”19 and they 
have used the term “racial formation to refer to the 
process by which social, economic and political forces 
determine the content and importance of racial 
categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by 
racial meanings” (61 – 62). Race, like media, is also a 
heuristic, a way to understand, to reveal, the world 
around us. To return to Kawash’s argument regarding 
skin color:  
The modern conception of racial identity 
maintains an uneasy relation to the visual; the 
visible marks of the racialized body are only signs 
of a deeper, interior difference, and yet those 
visible marks are the only differences that can be 
observed. The body is the sign of a difference that 
exceeds the body. The modern concept of race is 
therefore predicated on an epistemology of 
visibility, but the visible becomes an insufficient 
guarantee of knowledge. As a result, the 
possibility of a gap opens up between what the 
body says and what the body means.
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By linking outside to inside in an effort to make the 
body transparent, the body becomes a signifier: by 
creating a gap between what one sees and what one 
knows, racial markers are placed in an ever-shifting 
chain of signification. 
Crucially, this gap between what the body says 
and what the body is taken to mean underlies the force 
of racism. As Ann Laura Stoler has argued, racism’s 
force lies in the productive tension between the 
somatic and the essential. Reflecting on how racial 
discourse slips between discussions of somatic and 
visual difference and notions of inner, essential 
qualities, Stoler argues:  
 
The ambiguity of those sets of relationships 
between the somatic and the inner self, the 
phenotype and the genotype, pigment shade and 
psychological sensibility are not slips in, or 
obstacles to, racial thinking but rather conditions 
for its proliferation and possibility. . . . The force 
of racisms is not found in the alleged fixity of 
visual knowledge, nor on essentialism itself, but 
on the malleability of the criteria of 
psychological dispositions and moral 
sensibilities that the visual could neither 
definitively secure nor explain.21  
Racial discourse has always been polyvalently mobile 
and capable of thriving in the face of uncertainty. Race 
as biology and race as culture are similarly mobile and 
flexible technologies. Focusing on race as a technology, 
as mediation, thus allows us to see the continuing 
function of race, regardless of its essence. It also 
highlights the fact that race has never been simply 
biological or cultural, but rather a means by which both 
are established and negotiated.  
Creating Differences: Eugenics and Segregation  
Like technology, race has never been merely cultural or 
biological, social or scientific. Indeed, the strict 
conceptual separation of culture from biology —nurture 
from nature, development from transmission—is a 
fairly recent phenomenon, stemming from the 
acceptance of Mendelian genetics. Focusing on US 
eugenics and segregation in the twentieth century as 
technologies of difference, this section outlines how 
accepting race as biology also makes race 
technological.  
Race did not simply move from a biological to a 
cultural concept. The early “mixed” nature of notions of 
race is evident in Linnaeus’s foundational description 
of the male variant of Homo sapiens asiaticus cited 
earlier: “Yellowish, melancholy, endowed with black 
hair and brown eyes . . . severe, conceited, and stingy. 
He puts on loose clothing. He is governed by opinion.” 
This description treats interchangeably visible physical 
traits (“yellowish”), psychological characteristics 
(“melancholy”), and cultural traditions (“loose 
clothing”). Similarly, Thomas Jefferson, writing in the 
eighteenth century, argued against incorporating 
African slaves into the nation, using a mix of both 
historical and natural reasons.
22 
Even in the nineteenth 
century, race was seen as encompassing both cultural 
and biological transmission. As George W. Stocking Jr. 
has argued, the terms race and nation differed not by 
nature but by degree, since both intersected with 
questions of “blood.”
23
 Both environmentalists and 
extreme hereditarians, that is, “started from the same 
inclusive idea of race as an integrated physical, 
linguistic, and cultural totality. Furthermore, because 
science—to paraphrase a number of contemporary 
social scientists—no longer separated the phenomena of 
the body from those of the mind, both hereditarians and 
environmentalists tended to assume that racial mental 
differences were related to racial physical differences” 
(15). The clear separation of biology from culture and 
transmission from development stemmed from 
Mendelian genetics’ strict separation of germ from 
somatic cells.
24
 This emphasis on the chromosomes as 
unchanging from generation to generation both made 
possible and relied on a belief in unchanging “eternal” 
features, many of which were racialized.
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The premise of eugenics—which seemingly 
defined race as biological—was the breedability of the 
human species. Charles Davenport, the father of US 
eugenics, argued in Heredity in Relation to Eugenics, 
his textbook on eugenics:  
Eugenics is the science of the improvement of 
the human race by better breeding or, as the late 
Sir Francis Galton expressed it:—“The science 
which deals with all influences that improve the 
inborn qualities of a race.” The eugenical 
standpoint is that of the agriculturalist who, 
while recognizing the value of culture, believes 
that permanent advance is to be made only by 
securing the best “blood.” Man is an organism—
an animal; and the laws of improvement of corn 
and of race horses hold true for him also. Unless 
people accept this simple truth and let it 
influence marriage selection human progress will 
cease.26  
 
This notion of traits in the blood, which can be manipulated 
through proper breeding, places eugenics within what 
Michel Foucault has called an “analytics of sexuality.”
27 
The 
term breeding exemplifies human races as technologically 
manipulable, while also muddying the boundary between 
culture and biology, human and animal. Agriculture, 
Davenport’s favorite metaphor —“the human babies born 
each year,” he writes, “constitute the world’s most valuable 
crop” — nicely encapsulates the intertwining of the natural 
and the cultivated that is necessary to human civilization.
28
 
Eugenics is necessary because biology is not enough.
29 
Davenport’s work also exemplifies the difficulty of 
separating the natural from the cultivated: in the end, he 
argued that any “characteristic,” such as vagrancy, evident in 
more than one generation, is transmitted through blood. 
Although Davenport’s work is now considered ideologically 
corrupt, race and breeding are still intertwined in more 
modern understandings of race. According to modern 
population genetics, a human race is a “breeding population” 
marked by certain gene frequencies.
30 
 
However, as the history of segregation and 
antimiscegenation legislation in the US makes clear, 
breeding populations, if they exist, are never simply 
natural but rather result from a complex negotiation 
between culture, society, and biology. Importantly, 
segregation was a response to failures of biological 
theories of the innate physical degeneracy of mulattos 
and Africans. It was also a response to the “confusion” 
brought about by emancipation. As Hartmann argues:  
The conception of race engendered by 
slavery and abolished by the Thirteenth 
Amendment made “black” virtually 
synonymous with “slave” and “white” with 
“free.” . . . Now that race no longer defined 
status, classificatory schemes were required 
to maintain these lines of division. The effort 
to maintain the color line, or, properly 
speaking, black subordination involved 
securing the division between the races and 
controlling the freed population. Central to 
this effort was the codification of race, which 
focused primarily on defining and containing 
blackness.31  
This codification—especially its “one-drop” 
formulation—widened the gap between what the body 
says and what it means, since it became increasingly 
difficult to read the signifier, let alone the signification.  
Segregation is an important US racial technology, 
a clarifying spatial mapping that creates stark racial 
differences where none necessarily exist. As Grace 
Elizabeth Hale has argued, “whites created the culture 
of segregation in large part to counter black success, to 
make a myth of absolute racial difference, to stop the 
rising.”
32 
Segregation made “race dependent on space, 
and the color bar became less a line than the ground on 
which southern people were allowed to drink and buy 
and stand” (228). Segregation, importantly, did not only 
map space but was also a reaction to the transgression 
of space brought about by modern technologies, such as 
trains. It fought mobility with immobility. Hale, 
analyzing the importance of segregation on trains, 
argues:  
For southern whites, however, more was at stake 
than comfortable plushy cushions and clean-
carpeted aisles. Whiteness itself was being 
defined in late nineteenth-century first class train 
cars. When middle class-blacks entered the semi-
public space of railroads, they placed their better 
attire and manners in direct juxtaposition with 
whites’ own class signifiers. Because many 
whites found it difficult to imagine African 
Americans as anything other than poor and 
uneducated, finely dressed blacks riding in first-
class cars attracted their particular ire. . . . 
Greater mobility made the poorest whites more 
visible to the rising white middle class as well. . . 
. Class and race, then, became more visibly 
unhinged as railroads disrupted local isolation. 
Confusion reigned. (128 –29)33  
Racist technologies thus sought to make clear 
distinctions in society where none necessarily existed. 
Segregation and eugenics are thus examples of what 
Foucault has called modern racism, a racism fostered to 
allow states, which are supposedly dedicated to the 
social welfare of their populations, to exercise 
sovereign power— that is, to punish and destroy. 
“Racism,” he writes, “is bound up with the workings of 
a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of 
races and the purification of the race, to exercise its 
sovereign power. The juxtaposition of—or the way 
biopower functions through—the old sovereign power 
of life and death implies the workings, the introduction 
and activation, of racism.”
34 
 
Importantly, though, for Foucault, modern racism 
did not simply apply to those who were subjugated. 
Extrapolating from Nazism, he argues that race wars 
became “a way of regenerating one’s own race. As 
more and more of our number die, the race to which we 
belong will become all the purer” (257). In terms of an 
analytics of sexuality, eugenics too applies to everyone: 
Davenport’s eugenics textbook, for instance, is directed 
at those middle-class readers who want to know “how 
to fall in love intelligently.”
35 
Eugenics redefined all 
humans as the carriers of eternal characteristics, making 
the base unit not the human but the trait. Racism 
renders everyone into a standing reserve of genes to be 
stored and transmitted.  
Mimicking Standing Reserves  
According to Martin Heidegger in his 1955 “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” the essence of 
technology is not technological. Indeed, by examining 
tools, we miss what is essential about technology, 
which is its mode of revealing or “enframing.” This 
mode of revealing, he argues, “puts to nature the 
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be 
extracted and stored as such”; once transformed into 
energy, it is also transmitted and circulated.
36 
Technology changes the nature of essence as such, 
making what is essential that which endures rather than 
its generic type, and it shrinks causality from the rich 
fourfold system discussed by Aristotle (comprising a 
material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and final 
cause) to one mode: “A reporting — a reporting 
challenged forth — of standing-reserves that must be 
guaranteed either simultaneously or in sequence” (23). 
Most damningly, enframing endangers man by 
rendering man himself a standing reserve:  
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer 
concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, 
exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the 
midst of objectlessness is nothing but the order 
of the standing reserve, then he comes to the 
brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the 
point where he himself will have to be taken as 
standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as 
the one so threatened, exalts himself to the 
posture of lord of the earth. In this way the 
impression comes to prevail that everything man 
encounters exists only insofar as it is his 
construct. This illusion gives rise to one final 
delusion: It seems as though man everywhere 
and always encounters only himself. . . . In truth, 
however, precisely nowhere does man today any 
longer encounter himself. (27)  
This endangerment, though, is not only a 
misrecognition and a reduction of man to a standing 
and circulating source of energy; it also makes it 
impossible for him to conceive of another kind of 
revealing, since it “conceals that revealing which, in the 
sense of poieses, lets what presences come forth into 
appearance” (27). Poieses, art, enables a revelation that 
does not reduce nature into a standing reserve, but 
rather lets it stand against man as an object.  
The resonances between Heidegger’s post–World 
War II reflections on the dangers of technology and 
analyses of race and racism are profound and perhaps 
not surprising given Heidegger’s involvement with 
national socialism. In a 1949 lecture on technology, 
Heidegger argued, “agriculture is now a motorized food 
industry, the same thing in its essence as the production 
of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination 
camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of 
countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture 
of hydrogen bombs.”
37 
The national socialist program 
reduced all humans to standing reserves: some to be 
destroyed, others to be optimized and made more 
productive. Intentionally or unintentionally, 
Heidegger’s discussion of the experience of the human 
as not even an object also resonates with the historical 
experience of people of color. Hortense Spillers, writ-
ing on the situation of slaves in the Middle Passage, 
argues, “under these conditions, one is neither female, 
nor male, as both subjects are taken into ‘account’ as 
quantities.”
38
 During this period, she argues, the 
captives are unmade culturally. The pain of nonrecog-
nition, which makes one neither object nor subject, has 
also been eloquently enunciated by Frantz Fanon:  
I came into the world imbued with the will to 
find a meaning in things, my spirit filled with 
the desire to attain to the source of the world, 
and then I found that I was an object in the 
midst of other objects.  
Sealed into that crushing objecthood, I 
turned beseechingly to others. Their attention 
was a liberation, running over my body 
suddenly abraded into nonbeing, endowing me 
once more with an agility that I had thought 
lost, and by taking me out of the world, 
restoring me to it. But just as I reached the 
other side, I stumbled, and the movements, the 
attitudes, the glances of the other fixed me 
there, in the sense in which a chemical solution 
is fixed by a dye. I was indignant; I demanded 
an explanation. Nothing happened. I burst 
apart.39  
In addition, race understood as a set of visible or 
invisible genetic characteristics is a mode of revealing 
that renders everyone into a set of traits that are stored 
and transmitted; race is then seen as what allows the 
human to endure through time as a set of unchanging 
characteristics.  
Yet crucially, for Heidegger, understanding the 
essence of technology also makes salvation possible: 
although enframing conceals poieses, it also makes 
poieses a saving power. “Because the essence of 
technology is nothing technological,” he writes, “essen-
tial reflection upon technology and decisive 
confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on 
the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on 
the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm 
is art.”
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According to Heidegger, poieses “brings forth 
truth into the splendor of radiant appearing” (34). 
Similarly, Fanon writes: “The crippled veteran of the 
Pacific war says to my brother, ‘Resign yourself to your 
color the way I got used to my stump; we’re both 
victims.’ Nevertheless with all my strength I refuse to 
accept that amputation. I feel in myself a soul as 
immense as the world, truly a soul as deep as the 
deepest of rivers, my chest has the power to expand 
without limit.”
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Thus the question becomes: To what 
extent can ruminating on race as technology make 
possible race as poieses, or at least as a form of agency? 
Can race become a different mode of creation or reveal-
ing? Race has historically enabled subversive action. 
Homi Bhabha, for instance, has influentially argued that 
colonial mimicry—the mimicking of the colonizers by 
the colonized, demanded by the colonizers—“is at once 
resemblance and menace.”
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 Understood as something 
that is repeatedly performed, race, like gender, opens up 
the space of parody and agency. Intriguingly, Fanon 
describes his strength in terms that trouble the boundary 
between nature and human: his soul as “deep as the 
deepest rivers.” This simile suggests an embracing of 
factors not usually considered human. That is, if race as 
technology does make it possible to expand without 
limit, could this power stem not from asserting the 
difference between humans and technology, technology 
and poieses, but rather from an acceptance of their 
similarities through race as prosthesis?  
Donna Haraway has influentially argued that we must 
embrace the breakdown in boundaries between human 
and animal, natural and artificial, mediation and 
embodiment. According to Haraway, “late twentieth-
century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the 
difference between natural and artificial, mind and 
body, self-developing and externally designed, and 
many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms 
and machines.”
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 Rather than condemning this 
situation, as does Heidegger, she argues for the cyborg 
as a utopian figure precisely because it reworks nature 
and culture so that “the one can no longer be the 
resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other. 
The relationships for forming wholes from parts, 
including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, 
are at issue in the cyborg world. . . . The cyborg would 
not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of 
mud and cannot dream of returning to dust” (151). As 
she notes, however, “the main trouble with cyborgs . . . 
is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism 
and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state 
socialism” (151). Thus, in dealing with cyborgs, one 
must always see things doubly and “see from both 
perspectives at once because each reveals both 
dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the 
other vantage point” (154).  
This question of seeing doubly—and indeed the 
act of seeing more generally, especially as filtered 
through both race and mass media—is taken up by the 
authors in this special issue. They examine race as both 
the imposition of a grid of control and as a lived social 
reality in which kinship with technology can be 
embraced. And most important, as previously noted, 
they frame this question of race and/as technology in 
terms of ethics. Race, for these authors, is 
fundamentally a question of relation, of an encounter, a 
recognition, that enables certain actions and bars others.  
 
Face-ing Public Exposure  
This special issue pursues race and/as technology by 
analyzing a wide range of phenomena: from the 
production of photographic evidence to digital art 
practices, from the rise of the raced brand image in 
advertising to the emergence of the generic Asian ter-
rorist in terror TV, from science fiction to legal cases 
and political speeches. Focused on the intersections of 
facial and racial recognition, it addresses the ways in 
which race constructs relations between self and other, 
private and public, visibility and invisibility. These 
articles argue that race, like one’s face, is not simply a 
private possession or technology —it is not a usually 
hidden “card” that one can choose to “play” publicly, 
but rather exists at the cusp between the public and the 
private, the visible and the invisible. As Jennifer 
González argues in “The Face and the Public: Race, 
Secrecy, and Digital Art Practice,” “race is . . . a rela-
tion of public encounter,” or, as Eden Osucha contends 
in “The Whiteness of Privacy: Race, Media, Law,” 
mass media are technologies of racialization, and the 
legal right to privacy is a response to this racialized, 
mediatized publicity. The other articles in this issue—
Lisa Nakamura’s “Interfaces of Identity: Oriental 
Traitors and Telematic Profiling in 24,” Thomas 
Foster’s “Faceblindness, Visual Pleasure, and Racial 
Recognition: Ethnicity and Technicity in Ted Chiang’s 
‘Liking What You See: A Documentary,’ ” and Beth 
Coleman’s “Race as Technology” —further investigate 
the relationship between media and race, publicity and 
privacy, cul-tural forms and embodied experience by 
examining the interrelationship between technical and 
racial productions.  
In her essay, González addresses the limitations 
of seeing technoculture as an ideal public sphere 
through insightful critiques of contemporary new media 
theory and digital art. Starting with the contradiction 
between the “desire to see online digital spaces as sites 
of universal subjectivity that can escape the limitations 
of race” and the “proliferation of racially marked 
avatars and experimental hybrids (human and 
nonhuman),” she argues that both positions reduce 
cultural and racial difference to the domain of visual 
signs in order to construct digital space as one free of 
aggression, exclusion, and invisibility. Taking on Mark 
Hansen’s analysis of Keith Piper’s work as revealing 
the corrupt emptiness of images and racial 
identifications in a capitalist system, and thus enabling 
what Giorgio Agamben has called “community beyond 
identity,” González argues that Piper’s work instead 
reveals how racial discourses elicit complex affective 
and embodied identifications. It is precisely because 
race is an embodied discourse that raced others cannot 
participate in community without identity, for, 
according to Agamben, community without identity is 
possible only if humans become a “whatever face”: “if 
humans could, that is, not be-thus in this or that 
particular biography, but be only the thus, their singular 
exteriority and their face, then they would for the first 
time enter into a community without presuppositions 
and without subjects, into a communication without the 
incommunicable.”
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This position, however, is 
impossible for “raced” others precisely because they are 
reduced by others to their face, although this does not 
mean that the face cannot produce ethical encounters. 
Indeed, González turns to Emmanuel Levinas’s 
theorization of the face to argue that it can make legible 
the absolute infinity of the other. In addition, rather 
than construct the digital as somehow outside 
commodified images, she investigates, through the 
work of digital artists Ken Obadake and Mongrel, how 
“visual culture (both online and off) is the very place 
where contemporary race discourse might be most 
powerfully critiqued and transformed.” Most 
provocatively, González concludes by redressing the 
question of the paradoxical erasure and proliferation of 
race online by positing race as the secret fundamental to 
the ongoing conflation of technoculture with the ideal 
public sphere. As she argues, “race and other forms of 
cultural difference have been historically presented as 
secret unknowns that require definition, mapping, 
measuring, and legislating by those in power to render 
them public.”  
Osucha also links races and faces as sites of 
exposure through an insightful analysis of the mass-
mediated and commodified faces of two women: Nancy 
Green, the first model for the mass-produced Aunt 
Jemima pancake mix, and Abigail Roberson, the “anti-
Jemima,” an upper-class white woman whose image 
was used, against her wishes, to advertise flour. 
Looking at the historical emergence of privacy as a 
right, most famously articulated by Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis in “The Right to Privacy,” Osucha 
argues that media publicity constitutes a technology of 
racialization. That is, the right to privacy, 
conceptualized as a property right in the self, emerged 
in response to the invasion of the domestic sphere by 
new visual technologies and media, an invasion that 
threatened to expose and “sell” all individuals as 
African Americans had historically been exposed and 
sold. She writes, “The specter of injury to privacy that 
haunts ‘The Right to Privacy’ and Roberson and the 
laws that followed in its wake thus finds more concrete 
expression in the media depictions of people of color in 
that era, images generically shaped by abjecting and 
frequently grotesque racial stereotype.” Focusing like 
González on race and commodification, Osucha 
emphasizes the historical dimensions behind this 
commodification. The right to privacy is inextricably 
linked to the construction of whiteness as inviolable 
and, in contrast, of other bodies as “natural” objects of 
visual consumption. Osucha’s analysis therefore reveals 
that the threat—or, conversely, what we might call the 
democratic potential—of mass media lies in the ways in 
which they threaten to racialize, to expose, everyone.  
Similarly addressing questions of race and 
publicity, Nakamura reveals how, after 9/11, the threat 
of raced others has been used to deny everyone’s right 
to privacy. In the landscape of terror TV, every face can 
and must be scanned so that the truth can emerge and 
the foreign terrorist in the nation be exposed. 
Examining the television series 24 in relation to face 
recognition technologies more broadly, Nakamura 
argues, “the horror of witnessing torture perpetrated 
both by and on American bodies, as well as the 
destruction of urban infrastructures in the US, is paired 
with the spectacle of the digital sublime in the form of 
advanced telecommunication technologies that perform 
the work of remote sensing and the identification of 
bodies and especially of faces.” That is, “the problem of 
correctly identifying the true and loyal ‘American,’ as 
opposed to the concealed Islamic fanatic, can only be 
solved by the deployment of highly advanced, 
spectacular surveillance and identification technologies, 
such as aerial and satellite photography, FRS [facial 
recognition systems], biometrics, frame enhancement 
technology, infrared visioning systems, and extensive 
databases and ‘traces’ of informational network traffic.” 
In terms of the “watchful eye” of facial recognition 
technology and the larger security society it supports, 
the ideal is to deny the mystery of every face—the basis 
for Levinas’s concept of ethics—and to render all of 
them into completely knowable entities. Importantly, 
this making of the face completely knowable also 
racializes the terrorist as Asian and Asian American. 
Terror TV justifies racist stereotyping by representing 
“both West Asians and East Asians as spies, permanent 
aliens whose loyalties are always in doubt”; the 
technologies used on these shows thus seem to reveal 
the rightness of racial profiling. Once again, race 
becomes the open secret that must be exposed.  
Foster also addresses questions of what it means 
publicly to recognize a face through a science fiction 
story by Ted Chiang and through new media and its 
theory. A highlight of Foster’s article is an investigation 
of how nature and culture are being reformulated within 
technoculture, a process encapsulated by what he calls 
“technicity.” Foster specifically focuses on how 
“processes of visual recognition and response are being 
reconceptualized in some technoculture contexts,” so 
that “today, this technical manipulability seems to be 
increasingly relocated to the level of the viewers’ cog-
nitive architectures and mental processes, understood as 
scientifically material, physically identifiable, and 
therefore open to change rather than reified or 
eternalized.” Rather than nature and culture simply 
changing places, though, Foster argues that Chiang’s 
“Liking What You See: A Documentary” reveals that 
the “breakdown in traditional conceptual distinctions 
between nature and culture, biological givens and social 
constructs, might also represent an opportunity to move 
beyond the impasse of these dichotomies to an 
understanding of the natural environment, including our 
own bodies, as something other than a constraint and to 
a recognition of our technology as something other than 
a neutral instrument or extension of our conscious 
will.” In particular, it is through this story’s 
representation of the perception and recognition of 
racial features—which are first classed as “ just 
cultural,” but then shown to intersect biology and 
culture in interesting ways—that a new form of 
technoscientific hybridity emerges.  
Finally, these questions of hybridity and of the 
possibilities of technology are taken up in Coleman’s 
piece. The proposition of race as technology, she 
argues, “moves race away from the biological and 
genetic systems that have historically dominated its 
definition, toward questions of technological agency”; 
that is, it moves race from an object to a technique. 
Drawing from a wide range of theories of technology 
and race, she addresses examples of both theorizations 
and enactments of race as technology that span 
philosophical texts and political speeches, cinema 
practice and film criticism, art and science. They 
include Barack Obama’s 2008 speech on race in 
Pennsylvania, the film The Battle of Algiers, recent 
debates on genomics, and James Snead’s theory of 
blackness as repetition. Acknowledging that the 
construction of race as technology can be used for good 
or evil, Coleman nonetheless argues that “race as 
technology . . . moves toward an aesthetic category of 
human being, where mutability of identity, reach of 
individual agency, and the conditions of the culture all 
influence each other.” That is, “if race as we know it is 
an ‘algorithm’ inherited from the age of Enlightenment, 
reprogramming its function from inheritance (a form of 
destiny) to insurrection provides the possibility of new 
formulations.” This is because the pronounced quality 
of race, Coleman finds, is its immateriality, “its speed 
of change, its sliding value, its apparent and invisible 
differences.” Coleman, like Foster, thus also 
investigates the extent to which modes of racial 
recognition allow us to address changes to visuality 
brought about by new technologies and by varied media 
forms.  
Race as technology thus problematizes the usual 
modes of visualization and revelation, while at the same 
time making possible new modes of agency and 
causality. Importantly, it displaces ontological 
questions of race—debates over what race really is and 
is not, focused on discerning the difference between 
ideology and truth—with ethical ones: what relations 
does race set up? The formulation of race as technology 
also opens up the possibility that, although the idea and 
the experience of race has been used for racist ends, the 
best way to fight racism might not be to deny the 
existence of race but to make race do different things. 
Crucially, however, this is not simply a private 
decision, since race has proven key to the definition of 
the private and the public as such. To reformulate race, 
we need also to reframe nature and culture, privacy and 
publicity, self and collective, media and society.  
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